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Judicial Control Over Passport Policy
Leon Hurwitz*
T o WRITE THAT FOREIGN POLICY is controlled by entities other than
the President and State Department is misleading for, by virtue
of its constitutional position, the Executive branch cannot be "controlled"
in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. But this is not to say
that those not able to control do not influence: Congress, public opinion,
and foreign governments influence but do not control. This paper is
concerned with the judiciary's role in influencing both the procedure
and substance of one particular aspect of foreign policy, namely, the
passport policy of the State Department. That a decision regarding pass-
ports is a foreign policy decision has long been advanced by the Presi-
dent and Secretary of State. It is generally accepted that the issuance
and regulation of passports is an integral part of the general conduct
of American foreign relations.
The President and Secretary of State usually exercise unlimited
discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs and the courts will not inter-
fere, for example, with the President's refusal to grant diplomatic recog-
nition nor will they comment on the use of American troops abroad.
If passports dealt solely with foreign policy, moreover, the Passport
Bureau would be free to dispense with due process of law in its decision-
making. The 1946 Federal Administrative Procedure Act specifically
exempts foreign affairs from the requirements of due process., But
passport decisions have been open to judicial interpretation because
basic constitutional issues are presented when the Secretary of State
limits the right to travel by arbitrary procedures. The courts have not
permitted the State Department to restrict constitutional guarantees
under the guise of "national interest" or "foreign policy."
The purpose of this paper, then, is to examine the process by which
the courts have removed effective authority from the Secretary of State
to conduct this aspect of foreign policy-not because passports do not
deal with foreign affairs but, rather, because even the conduct of
American foreign relations is subject to constitutional requirements. 2
* A.B., Bates College; Ph.D., Syracuse University; Assistant Professor, Cleveland
State University, Political Science Department.
1 Fed. Admin. Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1946).
2 This paper is concerned only with the question of U.S. citizens leaving the country;
and the welcome they may receive elsewhere is not relevant. The term "passport"
refers to the normal passport issued to the ordinary traveler and not to the various
types of special passports issued to the military or diplomatic corps.
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International Travel, Passports, and Foreign Policy
The United States Constitution is silent on the right to travel be-
yond the borders and as far as such travel is concerned, nothing was
done prior to 1918 to restrain citizens from leaving the country. This
excludes the 1799 Logan Act which has never been applied and is
largely a dead-letter provision because it is unenforceable. 3 The free-
dom to travel was a dominant theme in United States policy prior to
World War I: the War of 1812 and the War with the Barbary States
were due, in part, to unwelcomed restrictions placed upon American
traders; Japan was "opened up" in the name of freedom of access;
China was subjected to "spheres of influence" for everyone had the
right to travel and trade in China; and millions of immigrants were
permitted entry into this country.
It was not until 1918 that this unlimited right of American citizens
to travel abroad was restricted-a passport became a legal prerequisite.
This restriction was lifted in 1921. With the advent of World War II,
limitations were once again placed upon travel. International travel
was thus closely tied to passports because possession of the document
was now required by law before such travel could take place.
Passports are not a new phenomenon. They have existed since
biblical times, but their nature has changed since their first use. The
term "passport" was, at its inception, applied to a document given to
an enemy alien or to a departing foreign ambassador which permitted
the bearer to pass freely through the lines of the issuing power (a safe-
conduct pass).4 Passports were slowly transformed, however, into a
type of "letter of recommendation" issued by a government, or by
various officials of a government, to selected private individuals for use
abroad.5 The current usage is that a passport is a document issued only
by a specific official of a Government (usually the Secretary of State/
Foreign Minister or Interior Minister) only to its citizens or nationals
in order to identify the bearer when he is in foreign countries.6 It is
3 The Logan Act, forbidding private citizens from negotiating with a foreign govern-
ment, was directed at a member of the Senate who had persuaded Tallyrand to lift
the Napoleonic embargo against the U.S. and who also hoped to persuade the British
to stop the conduct which ultimately led to the War of 1812. See Wyzanski, Jr.,
"Freedom to Travel," Atlantic Monthly, Oct. 4, 1952, at 67. The Act reads: "Any
citizen of the United States, wherever he may be, who, without authority from the
United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence or
intercourse with any foreign government . . . with intent to influence the measures
or conduct of any foreign government . . . in relation to any disputes or controversies
with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States, shall be fined
not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both." 18 U.S.C.
§ 953, 62 Stat. 744.
4 Jaffe, "The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem," Foreign Affairs, Oct., 1956
at 17.
5 Reginald Parker, "The Right to Go Abroad: To Have and to Hold a Passport," 40
Va. L. R. 853 (1954).
6 Jaffe, supra n. 4 at 17.
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also a request to foreign governments to allow the bearer to pass with-
out delay or hindrance and in case of need to give all lawful aid and
protection.
The United States Supreme Court defined the nature of a passport
in 1835 as:
... a document which, from its nature and object is addressed
to foreign powers; purporting only to be a request that the bearer
of it may pass safely and freely; and it is to be considered rather in
the character of a political document, by which the bearer is recog-
nized in foreign countries as an American citizen, and which, by
usage and the law of nations, is received as evidence of the fact.7
The old idea of a passport, that it was a privilege granted only to
those in the good graces of the Government, was not harmful to liberty
because the document was not required for one to leave the country.
Between 1918 and 1921, and from 1942 to the present, the possession
of a passport is no longer a nicety but is a legal requirement." Through
a long process beginning in 1902, authority was granted, through Con-
gressional Acts and Presidential Proclamations, to the Secretary of
State to issue passports (or to refuse to issue passports) in his capacity
of chief officer for the conduct of American foreign policy.9
It was believed that since the Department of State was concerned
with foreign policy and that since international travel was a function
of that policy, the Department should have authority over passports in
order to regulate travel. President Eisenhower clearly emphasized this
view in 1958:
Since the earliest days of our Republic, the Secretary of State
has had the authority to issue or deny passports. Historically this
authority stems from the Secretary's basic responsibilities as the
7 Urtetiqui v. d'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 699 9 L. ed 690, 698 (1835). "It is a mere
ex-parte certificate; and if founded upon any evidence produced ... establishing the
fact of citizenship, that evidence . . . ought to be produced . . . as higher and better
evidence of the fact." Id. The State Department, however, believed the passport was
evidence of citizenship and lack of the document would prevent the citizen from re-
ceiving the benefits of U.S. protection while abroad. The Department comments:
"Possession of the passport indicates the right of the bearer to receive the protection
and good offices of American diplomatic and consular officers abroad. The right to
receive the protection of the Government is correlative with the obligation to give
undivided allegiance to the U.S. A person whose activities, either at home or abroad,
promote the interests of a foreign country . . . should not be the bearer of an Amer-
ican passport." "Department Policy on Issuance of Passports," U.S. Dept. of State,
Bulletin, June 9, 1952 at 919. I would add, however, that the right to U.S. protection
derives from the fact of citizenship and not from the possession of a passport.
8 There are several exceptions to this requirement, however. A passport is not re-
quired if one's destination is within the Western Hemisphere. But the document is
necessary for countries outside the Hemisphere.
9 For the relevant passport laws and regulations, see the following: Foreign Rela-
tions and Intercourse, 22 U.S.C. 212 (1902); 22 U.S.C. 213 (1917); 22 U.S.C. 211 (a)
(1926). War and National Defense, 50 U.S.C. 785 (1954); Immigration and National-
ity Act, 8 U.S.C. 1185 (1952); Exec. Order No. 7856, 22 C.F.R. 51.75, 51.77 (1938);
Presidential Proclamation No. 3004, 18 F.R. 489 (1953).
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principal officer of the President concerned with the conduct of
foreign regulations. . . the Secretary should have clear statutory
authority to prevent Americans from using passports for travel to
areas where there is no means of protecting them, or where their
presence would conflict with our foreign policy objectives or be
inimical to the security of the United States.'(
Armed with this authority to regulate passports, the Department's
Passport Division began to deny passport applications in a most ar-
bitrary and capricious manner on grounds that the affected persons'
activities would not be in the "best interests" of the U.S. The passport
of Beverly Hepburn was not renewed for allegedly engaging in the in-
ternal political affairs of Guatemala. A Department spokesman said
that to renew the passport would not have been in the national interest."
Miss Hepburn was not afforded the opportunity of a hearing nor was
she allowed to appeal the decision, for private citizens cannot contest
foreign policy decisions.
Paul Robeson's passport was revoked because "... any trip that
Robeson would make would not be in the interest of the United States."
The New York Times reported that Robeson's activities in left-wing
movements and his outspoken criticism of this country's international
posture had much to do with the revocation of his passport.12 One of
the most tenuous arguments offered for revocation was put forth by the
Justice Department in a brief filed before the District of Columbia Dis-
trict Court in behalf of the Secretary of State. The Government argued
that ". . . if Robeson spoke abroad against colonialism he would be a
meddler in matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of
State." 13
Passport applications were denied for no apparent reason. Disclosure
of the reasons it was thought, would prejudice the conduct of U.S.
foreign relations. John Foster Dulles consistently maintained that pass-
port denials could be effected in camera under the guise of foreign
policy. Dulles comments:
I have reached this conclusion denial of passport on the basis
of confidential information contained in the files of the Department
of State, the disclosure of which might prejudice the conduct of
U. S. foreign relations . . . and because the issuance of a passport
would be contrary to the national interest. 14
10 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Administration Recommends New Passport Legislation,"
cited in U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, Aug. 11, 1958 at 250.
11 N. Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1953 at 8.
12 N. Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1950 at 1.
13 Brief for Appellee, p. 20. Robeson v. Acheson, 198 F. 2nd 985 (D.C. Cir., 1952).
14 John Foster Dulles, "Appendix to Opinion of the Court Decision and Findings of
the Secretary of State in the Case of Weldon Bruce Dayton," Dayton v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 144, 153, 2 L. ed 2d 1221, 78 S. Ct. 1127 (1958).
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Other passports were denied because the applicant wished to
travel to areas where the U.S. did not maintain the usual diplomatic
civilities. The State Department refused to issue passports because
the prospective traveler could not be afforded protection for it was
believed that protection of citizens was in accord with the "best in-
terests" of the nation. Robert F. Cartwright, former Administrator of
the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs within the Department of
State, comments to this effect:
Generally speaking, the United States will not validate pass-
ports for travel to countries with which we do not have diplomatic
relations. Americans traveling to such countries cannot be ex-
tended the usual protection offered American citizens and property
abroad by our embassies and consulates abroad.15
It appeared that the Department was slowly evolving a standard
that a citizen could not travel to any country if he could not be af-
forded diplomatic protection. But this standard was not applied fairly
or consistently and, consequently, there was no standard. A passport
was revoked not because of the non-presence of an ambassador, but,
rather, because the Ambassador did not like the prospective visitor,
did not wish to protect him, or did not want him in "his" country.
The passport of a Mr. Clark, former Chief Justice of the United
States High Commission's Court of Appeals in West Germany, was in-
validated for travel to Berlin because he had made some remarks pro-
testing the arrest of American citizens by German authorities. It was
reported that the then United States Ambassador to the German Fed-
eral Republic, Dr. James B. Conant, had strongly objected to Judge
Clark's visit and did not want him granted re-entry privileges.16
Judge Clark comments on this bizarre affair:
It is preposterous to say that Dr. Conant can exercise some
sort of censorship on persons whom he wishes or does not wish to
come to the country to which he is accredited. This has never
been held to be the function of an Ambassador. 17
The arbitrary and capricious action described above was pursued
on grounds that a passport decision was a foreign policy decision and,
therefore, the Department had absolute power and discretion to take
such action. The Department's conception of the role passports had in
the conduct of foreign relations bears citing at length for it illustrates
the rationale underlying the total process of passport and travel regu-
lation:
15 Hearing before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the
Judiciary, 85th Congress, 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 101 (1957).
16 N. Y. Times, July 9, 1955, at 31.
17 Id.
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The Secretary's authority both to deny or restrict passports
stems from his basic Constitutional powers in the conduct of foreign
relations . . . [he] may deny passports [because] . . . the appli-
cant's travel . . . is inimical to U.S. foreign policy or detrimental
to the orderly conduct of U.S. foreign relations . . . . I believe we
have a responsibility to see to it that individual Americans are not
allowed capriciously to disturb the delicate international situation
by breaking restrictions which have been imposed for sound foreign
policy reasons.18
It is true that if the Department's authority to make decisions were
based clearly and solely on foreign policy issues, the courts would not
substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary and the Depart-
ment would then be free to dispense with both procedural and sub-
stantive due process. But such decisions limiting international travel
are not solely "foreign policy" for they affect basic constitutional rights.
The courts, therefore, have maintained close scrutiny over the Depart-
ment's actions in order to insure that administrative discretion did not
eliminate procedural or substantive justice.
Judicial Control Over Foreign Policy
The above remarks demonstrated that the Secretary of State be-
lieved it was incumbent upon him to determine, in his sole judgment
and discretion, whether the travel of a particular citizen was in accord
with the best interests of the nation. The Secretary also believed that
he was the sole determinator of the country's "best interests." Although
the Secretary has pleaded that the act of travel regulation is within his
sole domain, the courts seem more impressed with the citizen's rights
than with foreign policy requirements.
The right to travel has been re-affirmed several times against var-
ious restrictions placed upon it. In 1900, Chief Justice Fuller in
Williams v. Fears,19 stated:
The liberty, of which the deprivation without due process of
law is forbidden, means not only the right of the citizen to be free
from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration,
but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be
free in the enjoyment of all his facilities; where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avoca-
tion, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
Is Roderic L. O'Connor, "The State Department Defends," Saturday Review, Jan. 11,
1958 at 11, 12. Mr. O'Connor continues: "When the Secretary issues a passport re-
stricted for travel to certain areas, he is, in our view, making a determination that
it is contrary to the foreign policy objectives of the U.S. to have American citizens
traveling within those areas . . . if this authority is used on grounds which are clear-
ly based on foreign policy the courts will not substitute their judgment for that of
the Secretary. . . . The Secretary of State's power to withdraw or withhold a citizen's
passport is not designed to be a punishment. It is designed as an instrument of for-
eign policy."
19 Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274; 45 L. ed 186, 188, 21 S. Ct. 128 (1900).
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proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned ...
More recently, in 1964, the Supreme Court re-affirmed this right
to travel. Mr. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion in Aptheker
v. Secretary of State,20 stated:
The right to move freely from state to state is a privilege and
immunity of national citizenship. 20 a None can be barred from exer-
cising it, though anyone who uses it as an occasion to commit a
crime can of course be punished. But the right remains sacrosanct,
only illegal conduct being punishable.
Absent war, I see no way to keep a citizen from travel within
or without the country unless there is cause to detain him.
Through a long legal process, the Courts have intervened in the
Department's decision-making process regarding restraint of travel. The
passport of a Miss Bauer was cancelled for the sole reason that her
activities would be contrary to the best interests of the U. S. No op-
portunity was afforded Miss Bauer to appeal the "foreign policy" de-
cision. A Federal District Court reversed this action. 21 Even though the
Court recognized that the conduct of foreign affairs is a political matter
within the discretion of the Executive, it was held that such conduct
must not be in conflict with any constitutional provisions. The Dis-
trict Court states in Bauer v. Acheson:
This Court is not willing to subscribe to the view that the execu-
tive power includes any absolute discretion which may encroach on
20 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500; 12 L. ed 2d, 992; 84 S. Ct. 1959 (1964).
The Department of State has listed various criteria it has employed as "cause" to
restrict travel: (1) fugitives from justice and persons under court restraining orders;
(2) persons repatriated at government expense, repayment not being made; (3) per-
sons likely to become public charges; (4) criminals with long records and recent
offenses; (5) participants in political affairs abroad whose activities were deemed
harmful to good relations and persons whose previous conduct abroad has been such
as to bring discredit on the U.S. and cause difficulty for other Americans; (6) fraud-
ulent applications; (7) persons determined to be mentally ill; (8) minor children
whose travel is objected to by one or both parents; and (9) persons whose activities
abroad would violate the laws of the U.S. These categories are based on answers
given by the Department of State to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hear-
ings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Department of State Pass-
port Policies, 85th Congress, 1st Session, at 38, 39 (1957) as cited by the Report of the
Special Committee to Study Passport Procedures of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Freedom to Travel at 45-46 (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co.,
1958).
This Report has given its approval to criteria (1), (2), (6), (7), and (8) above
as grounds upon which to deny a passport. For (3) the Report believes that the
State Department has no authority to determine the financial status of an applicant
except relating to (2). As to (4), it is difficult to determine exactly what is a "long
record" and what constitutes a "recent" offense. Besides, as the Report states, a
criminal is as free to travel as any other citizen once he has been punished (it is
immaterial if foreign countries refuse entry). The Report does not agree with (5)
as a cause to deny passports and neither do the courts. The last criterion, (9),
should not be employed because the policing of criminal activities, within or outside
the U.S., should not be administered by the Department of State.
20a Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
21 Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
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the individual's constitutional rights, or that the Congress has
power to confer such absolute discretion. We hold that like other
curtailments of personal liberty for the public good, the regulation
of passports must be administered, not arbitrarily or capriciously,
but fairly, applying the law equally to all citizens without dis-
crimination, and with due process adopted to the exigencies of the
situation.22
The lack of any procedure by which the affected applicant could
appeal the decision of the Department voided the Bauer determination.
The State Department, consequently, established a Board of Passport
Appeals. 23 But notwithstanding the creation of this Board of Appeals,
the individual applicant continued to have little effective redress for
the State Department maintained that they could not violate the con-
fidential character of the passport files by making them public. The
Department based this insistence of non-exposure on the grounds that
the conduct of foreign relations would be jeopardized if the reasons for
their action were to be publicized.2 4 The Courts, however, refused to
sanction the denial of passports based on confidential information in the
possession of the Secretary and which was kept out of the reach of the
applicant-this was held to be unconstitutional as a denial of due
process. 2
5
The State Department also maintained that it was contrary to the
national interests if Communists were allowed to travel abroad and
engage in activities which would advance the Communist cause. A
Communist was, for the State Department, any individual who belonged
to one of the subversive organizations on the Attorney General's List.
The Court ruled that this List was designed for screening government
employees and could not be used to determine who could or could not
go abroad.2
A new method of determining who were Communists was thus
needed by the Department. They discovered a relatively simple pro-
cedure: anyone who refused to sign an affidavit denying membership in
the Communist Party was ipso facto a Communist and could not ob-
tain a passport. The Secretary refused to issue a passport to Rockwell
Kent because he would not sign such an affidavit. Mr. Kent stated that
22 Id.
23 Rules of the Board of Passport Appeals, 22 C.F.R. 51.151-51.170, 9 Jan., 1954, 19
F.R. 161.
24 The Department comments: "The very nature of foreign negotiations requires
caution and secrecy, and the premature revelation of the President's acts, or his
motives, may ruin in an hour the results of laborious diplomacy.... [C]ourts ought
not risk the exposure of reasons for passport cancellation when such exposure will
inevitably in some cases put in jeopardy delicate foreign relations." Defendant's
Memorandum, at 2, 3, Foreman v. Dulles, Civil No. 4924-54, (D.D.C., 1955).
25 Clark v. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 950 (D.D.C. 1955); Kamen v. Dulles, Civil No. 1121-
55, (D.D.C. 1955); Nathan v. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C. 1955).
26 Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F. 2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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"I am not a Communist and I have never been a Communist, but I'll
be damned if I will sign one of those things." 27 Mr. Kent instituted ac-
tion against the Secretary of State. The Supreme Court held that Para-
graph 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and Para-
graph 1 of the Act of Congress of 3 July, 1926 did not authorize the
Secretary of State to withhold a passport for non-compliance with the
signing of an affidavit.28
The above cases assumed that the Secretary had broad discretion
to deny passports but the courts did not subscribe to the view that
this discretion was absolute and thus they provided the applicant with
various procedural safeguards. Due process of law would mean very
little if the Secretary could deny a passport application on any sub-
stantive grounds he thought sufficient. That is to say, if the Courts
could not intervene with substantive issues, it would mean the Secre-
tary could continue to refuse applications for practically any reason as
long as he observed due process. There were two main substantive
issues concerned in the denial of passports: (1) a Communist could not
travel anywhere and (2) no one, including Communists, could go to
certain countries.
The refusal to grant passports to Communists was based on the
view that international travel by Communists would threaten the na-
tional security of the United States. Pursuant to the Internal Security
Act of 1950, the Secretary of State adopted the policy of refusing to
issue passports to those Americans (Communists) who were allegedly
working against the national interest. This view is illustrated by the
1959 remarks of John Hanes, the Administrator of the Department's
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, when he stated that the pos-
session of a United States passport
... clothes them [the Communists] abroad with all the dignity and
protection that our government affords. And yet their dedicated
purpose in life is to destroy our Government and our freedom. 29
This practice of withholding passports from Communists did not
reach the Supreme Court until 1964. In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,3 0
the substantive issue of whether the Department could refuse passports
to members of communist organizations was under review. The Su-
preme Court held that such practice was unconstitutional because it
discriminately restricted the right to travel, thereby abridging the liberty
27 N. Y. Times, July 9, 1955, at 31.
28 Kent et Briehl v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 2 L. ed 2d 1204, 78 S. Ct. 1113 (1958).
The Court did not rule on the question whether it was constitutional to withhold a
passport from a Communist: it was immaterial at that point whether the applicant
was, or was not, a Communist.
29 U. S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, May 18, 1959 at 724.
30 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 387 U.S. 500, 12 L. ed 2d 992, 84 S. Ct. 1959 (1964).
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guaranteed by the 1st, 5th and 14th Amendments. Mr. Justice Gold-
berg delivered the opinion of the Court:
Since freedom of association is itself guaranteed by the 1st
Amendment, restrictions imposed upon the right to travel cannot
be dismissed by asserting that a citizen's right to travel could be
fully exercised if the individual would first yield up his member-
ship in a given association.31
Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, stated:
Under the due process clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments,
neither the Secretary of State nor any other government agent
can deny people in the United States their liberty to do anything
else except in accordance with the Federal Constitution and valid
laws made pursuant to it.
The entire Subversive Activities Control Act is unconstitu-
tional as (1) a bill of attainder, (2) restricting liberty without the
benefit of a trial according to due process, which requires a jury
trial after indictment, and (3) denying the freedom of speech, press,
and association.3 2
The Aptheker decision effectively eliminated the Department's
power to withhold passports from Communists. Henceforth, one's polit-
ical persuasion could not be employed to justify the Department's re-
fusal to grant passports.
The Department's powers and prerogatives in this "foreign policy"
area were slowly being eroded by the Courts. The Department found
itself obligated to issue passports to practically every applicant. The
Aptheker case did not however touch upon the second substantive issue,
namely, the long-term practice of the Department of banning all travel
to certain areas, regardless of one's political beliefs. This question came
to the Supreme Court in 1965 and 1967.
The Department of State denied the request of Louis Zemel to vali-
date his passport for travel to Cuba as a tourist. Zemel instituted a
suit in a District Court against the Secretary of State arguing that
the section of the Immigration and Nationality Act relating to travel
control of citizens during a national emergency and the section of the
Passport Act authorizing the Secretary of State to issue passports under
rules prescribed by the President were unconstitutional. He also
claimed that the Secretary's regulations restricting travel to Cuba (and
other countries) were invalid.33
The three judge District Court, in a 2-1 decision, ruled against
Zemel. The Court held that the Secretary of State is not authorized
to withhold passports of citizens because of their beliefs or associations.
Such a standard could not be employed to restrain the citizen's right
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Zemel v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 65 (D.C. Conn., 1964).
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of free movement and that the Government does not have the power
to restrain travel of citizens with those politics it disagrees.34 But, the
Court continued, the Government does have the power to forbid the
travel of all citizens to particular geographic areas because of war or
national emergency. Judge Blumenfield comments:
This is a regulation that . . . designates certain parts of the
world forbidden to all American travelers. This can hardly be re-
garded as arbitrary or capricious by this plaintiff.
Congress has provided that the Executive should take all neces-
sary steps short of an act or war to protect the rights and liberties
of American citizens on foreign soil (22 U.S.C.A. 1732).
Certainly it is consistent with an overall policy that he should
exercise that authority granted by law, to prevent incidents oc-
curring in those countries where normal diplomatic relations are
non-existent. 35
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's de-
cision on direct appeal.36 In a 6-3 decision, the Court held: (1) the
Passport Act of 1926 contains a grant of authority to the Executive to
impose area restrictions on the right to travel and thus to refuse to vali-
date the passports of United States citizens for travel to Cuba, (2)
the Secretary's refusal violated neither due process nor the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of free speech, and (3) the Passport Act contains suf-
ficiently definite standards for the formulation of travel controls by
the Executive. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the
Court:
In this case . . . the Secretary has refused to validate appel-
lant's passport, not because of any characteristic peculiar to appel-
lant, but rather because of foreign policy considerations affecting
all citizens.
... the fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due
process of law does not mean that it can under no circumstances
be inhibited . . . the Secretary has justifiably concluded that travel
to Cuba by American citizens might involve the nation in dangerous
international incidents, and that the Constitution does not require
him to validate passports for such travel.37
The Supreme Court thus declared in Zemel v. Rusk that the Secre-
tary of State has the authority, emanating from his position as the chief
34 Supra n. 30.
35 Id.
36 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 L. ed. 2d 179, 85 S. Ct. 1271 (1965), reh. den. 382 U.S.
873.
37 Id. Justice Black dissented on the grounds that the Passport Act violated the
provision in Article 1 of the Constitution granting all legislative power to Congress.
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Goldberg, dissented with the view that restric-
tions on the right to travel in times of peace should be particularized that a First
Amendment right is not precluded unless some clear countervailing national interest
stands in the way of its assertation.
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officer concerned with the conduct of U.S. foreign relations, to declare
certain countries off limits to all citizens and that otherwise valid pass-
ports need not be specifically endorsed for travel to such countries. But
recent events have redefined Zemel v. Rusk. It appears that the Zemet
case established only the principle that the Secretary does not have to
endorse an otherwise valid passport for certain countries and Zemel
did not touch upon the question whether a U.S. citizen could or could
not go to the banned areas or be prosecuted if he did visit the proscribed
countries.
The Secretary is not required to endorse a passport for travel,
let us say, to Cuba. But the passport has to be issued and validated for
travel to other countries not on the proscribed list. Since most foreign
countries require a valid and endorsed passport before granting entry
visas, the area travel ban was relatively successful-one could not go
to Cuba without a passport specifically endorsed for Cuba. But, what
are the consequences if one or all of the proscribed countries do not
require an endorsed passport before entry will be permitted and the
traveler visits such country in a round-about manner, that is, he does
not leave the United States directly for that country nor does he return
directly? The traveler has thus conformed to the legal requirement
of not leaving or entering the U.S. without a valid passport. But, is he
liable for prosecution (up to 5 years imprisonment and/or a fine of
$5000) under the regulations issued by the Secretary of State for having
traveled in these areas? 38 These latter questions came to the Court in
1967.
In 1962, Mrs. Helen Travis entered Cuba without a passport
specifically endorsed for that country. She did, however, have posses-
sion of an otherwise valid passport. She did not leave the U.S. directly
for Cuba nor did she return directly. Mrs. Travis was convicted of
traveling to Cuba without a valid passport in violation of section 1185 (b)
of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act. The conviction was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals and the decision was then appealed to
the Supreme Court.39 Messrs. Lee, Levi, and Laub were indicted in a
District Court in 1966 for conspiring to violate the 1952 Immigration
and Nationality Act-arranging travel to Cuba for persons whose pass-
ports were not endorsed for Cuba. The District Court dismissed the
indictment and the U.S. appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.40
A unanimous Court reversed Travis' conviction and affirmed Lee,
Levi, and Laub's dismissal on grounds that the statute under question
was not violated since area restrictions are not criminally enforceable
upon an otherwise valid passport. That is to say, one can be prose-
38 Immigration and Nationality Act, supra n. 9.
89 Travis v. U.S., 385 U.S. 491, 17 L. ed. 2d 536, 87 S. Ct. 583 (1967).
40 U.S. v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 17 L. ed. 2d 526, 87 S. Ct. 574 (1967).
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cuted for leaving or entering the U.S. without a valid passport but since
the people who went to Cuba did have a valid passport when leaving
and returning to the United States, no crime was committed. Mr.
Justice Fortas gave the opinion of the Court:
In view of this overwhelming evidence that Section 215 (b)
does not authorize area restrictions, we agree with the District
Court that the indictment herein does not allege a crime. If there
is a gap in the law, the right and the duty, if any, to fill it do not
devolve upon the courts. The area travel restriction, requiring
special validation of passports for travel to Cuba, was a valid
civil regulation under the 1926 Act (Zemel v. Rusk). But it was
not and was not intended or represented to be an exercise of au-
thority under Section 215 (b), which provides the basis of the crimi-
nal charge in this case.41
In other words, the Department of State does not have the au-
thority to enforce criminal sanctions not specifically provided for by Con-
gressional action against a violation of valid area restrictions. The
Secretary of State cannot issue and enforce criminal prohibitions. The
Court concluded that the affected people were charged with the con-
spiracy to violate, and the violation of, a nonexistent criminal prohibi-
tion.42
The State Department would now be required to seek Congressional
passage of the necessary statutes to make it a criminal offense to travel
to those areas banned by the Secretary. It is a meaningless provision
to ban certain areas if the prospective traveler could still visit them, as-
suming, of course, he leaves and enters the U.S. with a valid passport.
Congress has been most hesitant in the past to give the Secretary this
authority and the present Congress is likewise unprepared to make the
actual travel in certain countries a crime. It appears that even with the
continuation of certain countries on the proscribed list, the Department
of State has no real effective control over what is still maintained is a
foreign policy decision-United States citizens can travel in any country
which grants them entry without legitimate retribution being made
against them by the Department.
Faced with Congressional hesitation and judicial opposition, the
State Department in March, 1968, announced that it would no longer
continue its policy of punishing those people who violated the area
travel ban. Apart from the Travis and Lee, Levi, Laub cases,43 punish-
41 Supra n. 36 at 533-534.
42 Justice Fortas also wrote that it appeared that the Government's actions were
arbitrary for "although Department's records show that approximately 600 persons
have violated area travel restrictions since the enactment of § 215(b) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, supra n. 9, the present prosecutions are the only at-
tempts to convict persons for alleged area transgressions." This "active misleading"
by the Government was for Fortas another reason to dismiss the cases. Id.
43 Supra, n. 38, 39.
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ment usually took the form of passport revocations and denial of re-
newal. The Department also modified its ban by stating that certain
classes of people would now be able to receive endorsed passports for
these countries (China, Cuba, North Korea, and North Vietnam). Peo-
ple such as journalists, doctors, educators, etc. would now receive an
almost automatic endorsement of their passports. One could see that
this trend toward complete absence of travel restrictions was being
continued although the ordinary citizen still could not receive an en-
dorsement.
The March 1968 announcement was not endorsed by the Republican
Party. Although by no means having a monopoly oh restricting travel
under the guise of foreign policy, the Republican Party has traditionally
taken a dim view of the individual citizen's standing before "foreign
policy" passport decisions and one of the planks of the Party's 1968
Platform dealt specifically with these matters. It appears instructive
to cite the Republican's pre-election stand:
The Republican Party abhors the activities of those who have
violated passport regulations contrary to the best interests of our
nation and also the present policy of re-issuing passports to such
violators. We pledge to tighten passport administration so as to
ban such violators from passport privileges.44
It appears that the Administration is girding up once again for more
controversy and travel restrictions and not criminal prosecutions, for
only Congress can declare travel in certain areas a criminal act. This
would force the individual applicant into a long and costly procedure to
regain his passport but this assumes, and perhaps the assumption is er-
roneous, that the courts will follow stare decisis, that is, that passports
have to be granted except in narrowly defined cases (fraudulent ap-"
plications, fugitives from justice).
The travel ban continued to be in effect although, as stated above,
certain classifications of citizens now receive favored treatment. One is
unable to comment upon future events but the current position is
that the Department of State has had its authority effectively eroded
from this area of foreign policy by the courts-not because passports
and travel do not deal with foreign policy but, rather, because when
dealing with a constitutional liberty, the Department of State, even
when acting from foreign policy considerations, has to be subservient
to the Federal Constitution.
44 Cited from Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 90th Congress, 2nd Series, Vol. 24(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968), at 993. The regulations
the Republicans refer to are the regulations issued by the Secretary, not those pro-
vided for by Congress.
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Conclusion
One of the first conclusions to be drawn is that the Department
of State utterly disregarded the notion of due process of law in carry-
ing out a function claimed to be solely within its power. Passports
were denied or cancelled without notice, without opportunity to be
heard, without the chance to confront witnesses, without the benefit of
counsel, and, for a time, without opportunity to appeal the decision or
see the information upon which the decision was based. The courts
would not allow such practices to continue and finally convinced the
State Department that, even in foreign policy, the Department must
adhere to constitutional guarantees.
The courts also refused to sanction the usurpation of power by the
State Department not granted to it by either the Constitution or Con-
gress. The State Department attempted to determine who was or was
not a Communist, to punish future violators of U.S. law, to punish vio-
lators of foreign law, to determine the financial status of citizens; and
to determine the "best interests" of the United States. None of these
activities belong to the Department of State and the courts prohibited
the Department from pursuing them.
Progress has also been made in substantive questions: basic consti-
tutional rights were being limited when the Department refused to issue
passports to alleged Communists and other persons with whose politics
it did not agree. The courts, probably believing that those people who
actually work for the violent overthrow of the Government, wish to re-
main in the country to perform their duties, forced the Department to
issue passports to all political persuasions. The area travel ban has
been whittled down and so circumscribed that it is no longer an effective
tool on which to base foreign policy decisions. The Secretary may wish
to place the Bahamas on the restricted list but as long as the citizen de-
parts and leaves from the United States with a valid passport and is
welcome elsewhere, the travel ban cannot be employed to control the
external relations of the United States.
In conclusion, then, it appears valid to state that the courts have
indeed removed this specific area from the conduct of foreign relations.
Travel restrictions can no longer be used as a tool of foreign policy al-
though it still remains to be seen whether the current Republican Ad-
ministration intends to reassert its claim that foreign policy, and there-
by passports and international travel, ought to be wholly within the
discretion of the Department of State.
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